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Standing Issues in Tax Litigation
By Steve R. Johnson*
Issues as to standing have appeared in tax cases for generations, but the 
frequency of their appearance has 
increased markedly in recent years. In 
2014 alone, nearly a dozen opinions in 
high-profile tax cases plumbed the 
depths of standing doctrine.
This article summarizes the principal 
rules governing standing. Then it 
illustrates standing issues in tax 
litigation, in both traditional Code and 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
contexts.
Standing in Brief
“[T]he doctrine of standing serves 
to identify those disputes which 
are appropriately resolved through 
the judicial process.” Whitmore v. 
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). 
It reflects the intuition that “[n]ot 
every disagreement merits a lawsuit.” 
Scenic America, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Transportation, 983 F. Supp. 2d 170, 
175 (D.D.C. 2013).
Traditionally, standing is thought to 
have both constitutional and prudential 
dimensions. The constitutional 
dimension emanates from Article III, 
Section 2, Clause 1, which limits the 
scope of the federal judicial power 
to “Cases [or] Controversies.” The 
“irreducible constitutional minimum of 
standing” entails three aspects. The 
plaintiff must show that (1) she suffered 
a legally cognizable injury, (2) the 
injury is fairly traceable to the conduct 
complained of, and (3) a favorable 
decision would likely redress the injury. 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560–61 (1992).
Prudential standing embodies 
“judicially self-imposed limits on 
the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 
(1984). Although “not exhaustively 
defined,” it was said to reflect at least 
three broad principles: “the general 
prohibition on a litigant’s raising another 
person’s legal rights, the rule barring 
adjudication of generalized grievances 
more appropriately addressed in the 
representative branches, and the 
requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint 
fall within the zone of interest protected 
by the law invoked.” Elk Grove Unified 
School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 
(2004) (quoting id.).
However, federal courts generally 
are obligated to hear and decide cases 
within their jurisdiction. E.g., Sprint 
Commun., Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 
584, 591 (2013). Prudential standing 
(and other doctrines like ripeness and 
mootness) are “in some tension with” 
that obligation. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014)(seeming to 
convert “zone of interest” analysis from 
part of standing to part of statutory 
interpretation). This “has placed the 
continuing vitality of the prudential 
aspects of standing … in doubt.” 
Kentucky v. United States ex rel. Hagel, 
759 F.3d 588, 596 n.3 (6th Cir. 2014).
The Tax Court “exercises a portion 
of the judicial power of the United 
States.” Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 
U.S. 868, 891 (1991). Accordingly, 
“those elements that define and restrict 
judicial power, such as ‘standing,’ are 
necessarily applicable to [Tax Court] 
proceedings.” Anthony v. Commissioner, 
66 T.C. 367, 371 (1976).
Standing in Traditional 
Code Cases
“Traditional” cases involve one or 
a few taxpayers in forms of action 
prescribed by the Code, including 
deficiency actions, refund suits, and 
eligibility suits under provisions such 
as sections 7428 and 7476 to 7479. 
In cases such as these, indeed in most 
cases, a plaintiff’s “standing to seek 
review of administrative action is self-
evident.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 
895, 899–900 (D.C. Cir. 2002). For 
discussion of “self-evident standing,” 
see American Ins. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of 
HUD, 2014 WL 5802283, at *6 (D.D.C. 
Nov. 7, 2014).
Nonetheless, standing issues can 
arise even in traditional tax cases. For 
example, the Service sought to use 
evidence obtained from a search as 
to Kersting to support its adjustment 
against the Dixons. The Dixons alleged 
that the Service had obtained the 
evidence from Kersting illegally. The Tax 
Court, noting that one cannot assert the 
rights of others, held that the Dixons 
lacked standing to assert Kersting’s 
Fourth Amendment rights. Dixon v. 
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 237 (1988).
However, standing often has been 
invoked in questionable situations. For 
instance, the courts have relied on lack 
of standing to hold that a taxpayer may 
not (1) sue in his individual capacity 
when the Service issued a notice to him 
as possessor of unclaimed cash under 
section 6867, Matut v. Commissioner, 
84 T.C. 803, 808 n.7 (1985); (2) 
assert that the U.S. is violating treaties 
and committing war crimes as a basis 
for not paying her income taxes, e.g., 
Scheide v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 455 
(1975); (3) defend claimed charitable 
contribution deductions by arguing that 
section 170 is unconstitutional, Kessler 
v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1285, 1293 
(1986); or (4) as the nonrequesting 
spouse, argue about the amount of 
tax owed (pre-relief) by the spouse 
claiming relief under section 6015, 
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allowance. American Atheists, Inc. v. 
Shulman, 2014 WL 2047911 (E.D. Ky. 
May 19, 2014).
The section 107 cases are interesting 
in at least two respects. First, in 
general, one does not have standing 
simply as a taxpayer; this interest is 
insufficiently particularized. There 
is a narrow exception under Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The cases 
explored and rejected the applicability 
of that exception.
Second, the injury claimed by the 
atheists was that they were barred 
from receiving the benefit that church 
officiants were getting. But the atheists 
never applied to the Service to receive 
those benefits. The opinions differed 
sharply as to how likely the Service 
would have been to approve the 
applications had they been made. 
Whether the point is formalistic or not, 
the atheists’ failure to apply counted 
heavily against them. The causation 
aspect of constitutional standing is 
not met when the harm results from 
the plaintiffs’ own voluntary action 
or inaction.
Despite the upholding of the shared 
responsibility payment in National 
Fed. of Independent Bus. v. Sebelius, 
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), challenges to 
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) remain 
plentiful—and produce many standing 
issues. Liberty University and others 
challenged the validity of the ACA’s 
employer mandate. The government 
moved to dismiss for lack of standing 
on the ground that the plaintiffs face no 
actual or imminent injury. The motion 
failed. Liberty had the burden of proving 
standing, but the required showing 
may change as the case progresses. 
To defeat a motion to dismiss, Liberty 
“need not prove that the employer 
mandate will increase its costs of 
providing health coverage; it need only 
plausibly allege that it will.” Liberty 
Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 90 (4th 
Cir. 2013)(emphasis in original), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 683 (2013).
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e.g., Estate of Ravetti v. Commissioner, 
37 F.3d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1994). 
The taxpayers lost and should have 
lost on these issues. However, under 
Lexmark, supra, statutory interpretation 
(the Code sections at issue did not 
render consequential the contentions 
the taxpayers were offering) offers a 
better ground for rejecting the taxpayers’ 
positions than standing does.
Standing in APA Cases
Although traditional Code forms 
of action far predominate, increasing 
numbers of litigants base their suits 
against Treasury or the Service on the 
APA. Under the APA, redress is available 
to anyone “suffering legal wrong because 
of agency action, or adversely affected 
or aggrieved by agency action.” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 702. The reviewing court may, among 
other remedies, compel agency action 
wrongly withheld or set aside agency 
action that is arbitrary and capricious, 
in excess of statutory authority, or 
procedurally improper. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706 (1) & (2).
An APA challenge may be brought 
via “any applicable form of legal action” 
unless a special review scheme is 
mandated. 5 U.S.C. § 703. Thus, if a 
deficiency, refund, or other Code-based 
form of action is available, it must be 
used instead of suit under the APA. 
Plaintiffs also must overcome other 
hurdles in order to proceed under the 
APA. In addition to standing, these 
hurdles include such issues as ripeness, 
exhaustion of remedies, and the Anti-
Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421.
APA tax suits often pit powerful 
adversaries against each other: the 
government defending the regulation or 
other position against attacks by well-
organized and well-funded industrial or 
ideological interests, often fronted by 
one or several individual plaintiffs. The 
government typically argues that the 
plaintiffs lack standing to seek some 
or all of the relief sought. Some recent 
examples are noted below.
In Florida Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Treasury, 2014 WL 114519 
(D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2014), two bankers 
associations challenged Treasury 
regulations requiring reporting of 
information on U.S. accounts of foreign 
depositors, which information the 
Service would share with the revenue 
authorities of depositors’ home countries. 
The standing issue involved the doctrine 
of organizational or representational 
standing, under which an organization 
may litigate on behalf of its members 
under certain conditions. Noting that 
banks in the associations were directly 
affected by the regulations, the court 
found that standing was self-evident, 
without the need for detailed affidavits.
In another recent representational 
standing case, to fill the gap felt by 
invalidation of its mandatory program in 
Loving v. IRS, 742 F. 3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 
2014), the Service launched an effort to 
encourage unenrolled return preparers 
to “voluntarily” enhance their skills. The 
AICPA sued to invalidate this effort. The 
court granted the government’s motion 
to dismiss. One of the elements for 
representative standing is that at least 
one of the organization’s members would 
have standing to sue in its own right. 
This element was not met. The AICPA 
has no members who are unenrolled 
preparers, and the AICPA’s attempts 
to connect their members to the 
voluntary program were too speculative, 
conclusory, or unrelated. American Inst. 
of Certified Pub. Accountants v. IRS, 
2014 WL 5585334 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 
2014).
Atheist organizations and associated 
individuals brought suits seeking 
invalidation of the section 107 parsonage 
allowance. In 2013, the Western District 
of Wisconsin found that the plaintiffs 
had standing to challenge section 107(2) 
but not section 107(1). On appeal, the 
Seventh Circuit vacated the decision 
on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing. Freedom from Religion Found., 
Inc. v. Lew, 2014 WL 5861632 (7th 
Cir. Nov. 13, 2014), rev’g 983 F. Supp. 
2d 1051 (W.D. Wis. 2013). Another 
2014 decision also rejected, on standing 
grounds, a challenge to the parsonage 
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Several cases have challenged the 
validity of regulation section  
1.36B-2(a)(1), which extends the ACA’s 
premium assistance credit to persons 
enrolled in federal exchanges set up 
in states which declined to establish 
medical insurance exchanges. The courts 
typically have held that the governmental 
and private plaintiffs have standing. 
Even though part of their motivation is 
ideological, the plaintiffs face additional 
expenses under the ACA, which suffices 
to establish standing. E.g., Halbig v. 
Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014); 
see also King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 
(4th Cir. 2014); Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt 
v. Burwell, 2014 WL 4854543 (E.D. 
Okla. Sept. 30, 2014).
Conclusion
Standing issues are not the “meat 
and potatoes” of federal tax litigation. 
However, they are of growing 
importance. The able tax attorney 
should have at least working knowledge 
of the intricacies of standing doctrine. 
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